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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
decided, the mines were open, then the grantor was not even com-
mitting an enjoinable wrong unless the mining operations impaired
the security for the debt."
It has been suggested that the first action, in which the note-
holders joined, was analogous to a suit for sequestration or a writ
of estrepement, and that they should therefore be entitled to the
royalties collected in that action. However, the grantor's right to
the royalties accrued prior to the commencement of that action,
and as to the noteholders the royalties should be considered as
having been collected when the right to them accrued. Moreover,
the fact that the pleadings in the former action showed no inten-
tion of the noteholders to accomplish such a result, is fatal to this
contention.'
It is therefore submitted that the case was correctly decided, in
accord with the apparently unanimous authority on the point.1"
C. A. P., JR.
PLEADING - CERTAINTY - PROXIMATE CAUSE. - In an action
for injury caused to P's property in Ohio by D's blasting oper-
ations in West Virginia,' P alleged that D owed a duty of care in
the use of explosives which he failed to exercise; "that the nitro-
glycerin, dynamite, and other explosives exploded with such great
force and violence that the plate glass of the plaintiff stored in the
room occupied by him in Steubenville, Ohio, was destroyed, to the
plaintiff's damage." D demurred to the declaration. The circuit
court overruled the demurrer. Questions certified to the supreme
court. Held, that the declaration was defective in that it failed
8 The actual facts do not seem to have been controverted here, but there was
a question as to the extent of the mines legally "opened" by the operations be-
gun prior to the deed of trust. This question for the purposes of this com-
ment is one of fact, and was decided in favor of the grantor.
9 Childs v. Hurd, 32 W. Va. 66, 9 S. E. 362 (1889); Higgins v. The York
Building Co., 2 Atk. 107 (1840). There is apparently no authority which would
construe the prior action as something which it was not.
10 Needless to say, the actual result in the principal case leaves something to
be desired. The plaintiffs, holders in due course of the notes for which the
trust deed was given, are left without a remedy. It would also seem on princi-
ple that if an enjoinable wrong was being committed (which does not appear)
then recovery should be had after the fact. The chief difficulty seems to lie
in the lack of distinction between the case of an ordinary lease, and that of a
mineral lease, when there may be impairment of security. However, the law
appears to be settled in both instances, and probably in most cases it is fair
to restrict the mortgagee to the exercise of his various other remedies.
I The court held as to the substantive law that the law of Ohio applied since
the injury resulted in that state.
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sufficiently' to aver that the damage resulted to P from D's breach
of duty. Dallas v. Whitney.
2
The court bases its decision on Ironton Lumber Co. 'V. Guyan-
dotte Timber Co.3 which quotes Cyc. 4 "In consequence of the rule
that negligence to render a defendant liable must be the proximate
cause of the injury, connection between the act or omission and the
resultant injury must be shown, and a complaint is insufficient if
it fails to show such connection." This rule carried over into
Corpus Juris" is supported (according to the footnote) by federal
and Canadian decisions and by decisions of forty-one states, both
code and common law. Of the states applying the rule, West Vir-
ginia is perhaps one of the strictest. Some courts recognize a
declaration as good although cause and effect are not alleged if it
can be inferred from the allegations made." The West Virginia
court is not wont to recognize inference as satisfying the rule.'
Chittys lays down three purposes of pleading: to give notice
to the defendant, to raise an issue for the jury to decide, and to
present a statement of fact to which the court may apply the law.
Therefore the pleading should be certain enough to be understood
by one's opponent, the jury and the court.9 A declaration alleging
that "the defendant so carelessly and negligently conducted him-
self that the said mare of the plaintiff then and there was greatly
torn, kicked," etc.,10 with no other explanation than that the de-
fendant had put his horse into the stable with the mare is as useful
2 188 S. E. 766 (W. Va. 1936).
368 W. Va. 358, 69 S. E. 815 (1909).
4 (1908) 28 Cyc. 572.
5 (1928) 45 C. J. § 666.
6 Shea v. Nilima, 133 Fed. 209, 214 (C. C. A. 9th, 1904) (suggests remedy if
want more certainty, motion to make plea more definite) ; Broadstreet v. Hall,
168 Ind. 192, 80 N. E. 145, 10 L. R. A. (z.s.) (1907) ; Louisville & NL. R. Co.
v. Priddy, 254 Ky. 173, 71 S. W. (2d) 39 (1934); Franklin v. Butcher, 144
Mo. App. 660, 129 S. W. 428 (1910); Pratley v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 56 S.
W. (2d) 510 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
7 Gorsuch v. Woolworth Co., 104 W. Va. 98, 139 S. E. 472 (1927); Hannum
v. Hill, 52 W. Va. 166, 43 S. E. 223 (1902); but see Long v. Foley, 82 W. Va.
502, 96 S. E. 794 (1918); Snyder v. Wheeling Electrical Co., 43 W. Va. 661,
665, 28 S. E. 733 (1897) ("A declaration will be treated as alleging by im-
plication every fact which can be implied from its averments by the most
liberal intendment"). Other cases applying the rule: Conley v. Hill, 115 W.
Va. 175, 174 S. E. 883 (1934) ; Gorsuch v. Woolworth Co., 107 W. Va. 552, 149
S. E. 610 (1929); Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Virginia Western Power Co., 81 W.
Va. 298, 94 S. E. 372 (1917) ; Ironton Lumber Co. v. Guyandotte Timber Co.,
68 W. Va. 358, 69 S. E. 815 (1909).
8 1 CM=vY, PLEADING (16th ed. 1879) *236.
9 Berns v. Gaston Coal Co., 27 W. Va. 285, 288 (1885).
10 Strain v. Strain, 14 Ill. 367 (1853).
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as a lone allegation that the plaintiff's mare was injured. Although
the defendant might be given notice by the declaration, the court
is given none at all. On demurrer it must say that these facts do
not constitute a cause of action, for any of a number of things
might have happened to the mare irrespective of the defendant's
negligence.
The layman reading this declaration would probably wonder
what the plaintiff was suing for. The same cannot be said of the
declaration in the principal case. The series of words, "using ex-
plosives", "exploded with great force and violence" and "dam-
age" leads only to the conclusion that the alleged misuse of the
explosives caused unusual concussions of the air which broke the
glass.11 At least two legally trained minds understood this declara-
tion; i. e., the plaintiff's attorney and the circuit judge. It is sub-
mitted that that should be sufficient.'12  It is well to encourage
scientific pleading. If attorneys would pay more attention to the
rules of common law pleading, much time would be saved.13 But
we should remember that courts are dedicated to the adjudication
of the rights of clients. There is no sense in wasting time and
money to instruct attorneys in pleading.
1 4
F. W. L.
11 This declaration might admit of other proof, but other situations than the
one mentioned are improbable. It is extiemely technical to call an allegation
ambiguous because strained thinking might bring forth an ambiguity.
12 An implied allegation may be denied so as to raise the necessary issue for
the jury. Gilbert v. Parker, 2 Salk. 629 (1625) ; SUNDERLAND, CASES ON COM-
mON LAW PLEADING (2d ed. 1932) 450.
13ANDRn Vs, STEPHEN, PRINCIPLEs OF PLEADING (2d ed. 1901) 486; 4
MINoR, INSTITUTES (1893) 1288. Contra: Ballantine, The Need of Pleading
Beform in Illinois (1917) 1 ILL. L. BULL. 3; Whittier, Notice Pleading (1918)
31 HARv. L. REv. 501.
14 Note especially Gorsuch v. Woolworth Co., 104 W. Va. 98, 139 S. E. 472
(1927), and Gorsuch v. Woolworth Co., 107 W. Va. 552, 149 S. E. 610 (1929).
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